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The Great War in the Middle East as a Semi-Modern War 
by 
Frank JACOB and Riccardo ALTIERI 
!
Introduction 
The Middle-East was depicted as a sideshow of the First World War. With lesser 
casualties as they were caused in the battles of the Western front in Europe, more 
mobility and space for individual heroic actions it seemed to provide more space for 
traditional war tactics, which were no longer useful as a consequence of the highly 
modernized warfare in Europe. Edmund Allenby (1861-1936)   and Thomas E. Lawrence 1
(1888-1935)   became the key figures of the Middle Eastern campaigns, while Gallipoli 2
should become an emblem for British failure during the war years.   However, it was not 3
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East (New York: Doubleday, 2013); Bruce Leigh: T. E. Lawrence: Warrior and Scholar (Oxford: Tattered 
Flag, 2014); Lowell Thomas: With Lawrence in Arabia (London: Hutchinson & Co., 2011 [1924]).
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only the military genius of the two commanders which was responsible for the success of 
their campaigns; they were fighting different kinds of war.  
The landing operation of Gallipoli   was far more modern that one would assume by 4
subsuming it to the Middle Eastern war scenario. The region itself was never a 
homogenous region, but in contrast left sufficient space for different tactics and the use of 
modern technology.   Soldiers fighting in the Middle East could face trench warfare, gas 5
war  , attacks by planes, heavy artillery, machine gun fire, barbed wire on the one hand, 6
but also cavalry and camel attacks, guerilla warfare, surprise attacks and ambushes on the 
other. The Middle East thereby resembled the “art of war” of the European Western and 
Eastern front at the same time, and could be seen as a semi-modern war as a whole, a fact 
that the present paper wants to underline.  
Therefore we will compare different campaigns and the use of modern technology 
to show, why specific battlefields highly resembled the problematic situation of Western 
European battlefields while others left sufficient space for the creation of heroes and 
legends at the same time. After a discussion of the Gallipoli operation we will switch the 
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focus to the more mobile campaigns on the Arabian Peninsula have a close look at the 
tactics used by “Lawrence of Arabia”. We thereby aim to show the diversity of the 
Middle East as a theater of the First World War to strengthen the demand for more 
detailed studies of these war spaces, which should no longer simply focus on the failure 
of Gallipoli or the hero of the Arabian war scene.  
!
Gallipoli 
Gallipoli is mostly known as one of the darkest hour of British military history   and is 7
well described by Peter Doyle and Matthew R. Bennett as “a costly gamble intended to 
knock Turkey out of the war and to command the main supply line to Russia”  . Much has 8
been said about the reasons for the failure:  
!
“A combination of factors led to the failure of this plan, most particularly the 
ineffective-ness of naval artillery fire against land targets, the presence of mobile 
batteries on both the European and Asian shores and ineffective minesweeping by the 
Allies. This ultimately caused an escalation of the conflict, and a commitment to 
deploy troops in an invasion of the Gallipoli Peninsula.”   9
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!
Furthermore the geographic setting was responsible for the problems the soldiers had to 
face after their landing began. “[T]he local inadequacy of water supplies, the steepness of 
slopes, the incision of ravines, the precipitous nature of the cliffs, and the density of 
vegetation”   made the life of the troops as miserable as the higher positions of the 10
Ottoman soldiers and their machine guns.  
However, also the personal factor was responsible for the disastrous developments. 
While “Sir Ian Hamilton [1853-1947] was precisely the sort of commander that one 
might have chosen to lead the Dardanelles Expedition” the final campaign “proved [him] 
to be indecisive and lacking a firm hand with his subordinates.”   He was not able to give 11
clear orders or to become a strong and energetic leader for the landing troops, why he 
finally lost the public and governmental believe in his capabilities as a military 
commander.   The withdrawal “in humiliation and defeat”   was also due to the 12 13
inexperience of the troops, which were sent from different parts of the empire to execute 
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!  Ibid, 14.10
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a poorly planned mission.   The general staff had not possessed sufficient intelligence 14
information about the situation on the peninsula and the quality of the maps was really 
bad.     15
Despite this lack the mission was started, especially because the Dardanelles had 
been a strategic target in the war planning of the Royal Navy from the beginning of the 
war. In addition to the “the deadlock on the Western Front” and her majesty’s 
governments “appeals for assistance from Russia early in January 1915”   the important 16
figure of the British government and the British Navy, including Winston Churchill (First 
Lord of the Admiralty) and David Lloyd George (Chancellor of the Exchequer) were in 
favor of a fleet operation against Istanbul by sending a fleet through the straits, which 
would force one of the central powers out of war.   But the Ottoman Empire was not 17
unprepared and the military staff knew that the Dardanelles might be a target of the 
enemy.   Liman von Sanders and Enver Paşa were well prepared to welcome the British 18
and French landing and therefore “Sanders's ideas were formed before the Allied naval 
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attempts of February-March 1915 to break through into the Sea of Marmara, and 
therefore he stressed the need to defend the artillery of the Straits against Allied naval and 
land attacks.”   Consequently “[a]t no time after 17 August 1914 (…) were the 19
Dardanelles defences unready to receive an attack”   and the British underestimation of 20
their Ottoman enemy should cost many lives. In contrast to the assumptions of the 
military planners in London  
!
“[t]he Ottoman General Staff sent its best combat infantry divisions to defend the 
jugular of their empire. These divisions were well trained, well led, and very 
effective. The Gallipoli peninsula itself was the most heavily defended area in the 
Ottoman Empire, and the defensive planning for its retention encompassed years of 
effort and refinement. The principal tactical commander on the ground, Esat Paşa, 
was extremely energetic and experienced in the kind of fighting found on the 
peninsula, as were most of his subordinate leaders.”   21
!
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Fighting against “the cream of the Ottoman Army”   the campaign was doomed from its 22
start to resemble the bloody war of the Western front, a fact that was also supported by 
the terrain, which left only room for a stalemate leading to trench warfare.  
 Anyway, War Minister Herbert Kitchener (1850-1916)   was optimistic, because 23
he did not expect any resistance from the Ottoman side, a miscalculation that might have 
been a consequence of imperial arrogance as well.   Hamilton and his staff were 24
consequently “assembled in a piecemeal fashion”   and briefed only vaguely about the 25
environment. The commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force therefore had to 
admit that the peninsula “looks a much tougher nut to crack than it did over the map”  . 26
Additionally no surprise factor could help Hamilton to gain an advantage, because von 
Sanders had already heard rumors about an expedition and was able to get even more 
detailed information out of Egyptian newspapers.   Finally it seemed not to be surprising 27
at all when British as well as ANZAC troops lands on the southern and western parts of 
the Gallipoli Peninsula on 25 April 1915.  
!
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Having no special equipment for an amphibious landing operation the soldiers had to 
land by getting towed to the shore in simple rowboats. There, the well prepared units of 
the Fifth Ottoman Army were already waiting to do its “bloody job.”   Finally, the 28
“British assumptions regarding the Ottoman Army’s fighting prowess (which should have 
been questioned before the landing occurred) were about to have disastrous 
consequences.”   29
 The Ottoman soldiers started immediately to open fire against the approaching 
British and Australian troops and from the beginning of the operation it was clear, that it 
would not become the easy job the military staff had believed in. Hamilton’s men had to 
face machine guns and barbed wire. Consequently, their situation resembled the one of 
the soldiers in France. Hamilton seemed to recognize the hopeless situation when he 
writes: 
!
“we are struggling like drowning mariners in a sea of chaos; chaos in the offices; 
chaos on the ships; chaos in the camps; chaos along the wharves”  . 30
!
The military staff was looking for alternatives to end the stalemate, which should last 
until the end of the operation, why the Gallipoli campaign – like the Western and Eastern 
!  8
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!  Thiele, Gallipoli, 136.29
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front in Europe   – reached a chemical level of warfare as well.   The leading officers 31 32
speculated about the use of gas, which was finally not used until a year later in Palestine, 
but the hopeless situation on the peninsula made people think loud about the use of gas as 
well.   While the entente had hoped to overcome the trench warfare of the Western front 33
by the landing operation it opened a second stalemate scenario which resembled the 
technological warfare of the rest of Europe.  
 Consequently more than 30,000 respirators and 10,000 ‘gas helmets’   were 34
shipped to the battlefields of the peninsula, because one feared an Ottoman gas attack as 
well. All in all the Gallipoli campaign was similar to those fought in Western Europe and 
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regardless of the fact that the “operation was a fiasco”  , it was a modern one. Modern 35
warfare with all its technological possibilities to kill the enemy had determined the 
battlefield at Gallipoli. This was no spot for heroic battles; it was a spot to die from 
machine gun fire, artillery shells, or as a consequence of the harsh weather in the winter. 
When the governmental leaders as well as the military staff recognized the failure, they 
decided to evacuate the troops between December 1915 and January 1916 and “in stark 
contrast with the landings in April and August 1915, was well-planned”  .  36
!
Lawrence 
Compared to Gallipoli, another setting of the First World War was able to create a hero, 
who had to wage a totally different kind of warfare. Thomas E. Lawrence, who became a 
galleon figure of British guerilla warfare in the Great War, was also promoted by the 
exotic setting he was fighting in as well as by the stylization through the modern mass 
media.  
 Lawrence had been no military tactician who was trained for guerilla warfare in 
the Arabian deserts, a fact that he recognized by himself: 
“I was not practiced in that technique.  I was unlike a soldier: hated soldiering. Of course, 
I had read the usual books (too many books), Clausewitz and Jomini, Mahan and Foch, 
!  10
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had played at Napoleon’s campaigns, worked at Hannibal’s tactics, and the wars of 
Belisarius, like any other man at Oxford; but I had never thought myself into the mind of 
a real commander compelled to fight a campaign of his own.”   37
Despite this lack of experience, he was a man that could be made a myth  , one that is 38
still repeated in modern works about “Lawrence of Arabia” who set the desert on fire.  39
While the Arabian fight against the Ottoman rule was depicted in romantic ways, the 
support of the Royal Navy for resupply as well as air support was needed to win the 
battles.   The Arab irregulars might have been a powerful force, but they were “as unable 40
to defend a point or line as they are to attack it”  . Lawrence must have realized “that in a 41
stand-up fight against the better-disciplined Turks the Arabs would be doomed.”   42
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Therefore he reacted by starting a guerilla war, for which the environment was 
predestined: 
“How would the Turks defend all that (140,000 square miles) – no doubt by a trench 
line across the bottom, if the Arabs were an army attacking with banners displayed 
(…) but suppose they were an influence, a thing invulnerable, intangible, without 
front or back, drifting about like a gas? Armies were like plants, immobile as a 
whole, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. The Arabs might be a 
vapour, blowing where they listed. It seemed that a regular soldier might be helpless 
without a target. He would own the ground he sat on, and what he could poke his 
rifle at.”    43
Lawrence also recognized the potential of such a campaign for the total scenario of the 
First World War: 
“A man who could fight well by himself made generally a bad soldier, and these 
champions seemed to me no material for our drilling; but if we strengthened them by 
light automatic guns of the Lewis type, to be handled by themselves, they might be 
capable of holding their hills and serving as an efficient screen behind which we 
could build up”.   44
!  12
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While the press explained the heroic fight of the Arabs under the leadership of a noble 
Englishmen to the world public by describing the war in Arabia as a conflict, where a 
single man was still able to make a difference, and thereby proving that the old way of 
warfare might still exist, Lawrence himself had already recognized, that also a guerilla 
war needed modern technology to become successful, because otherwise his forces were 
not able to hold conquered spots – e.g. Umtaiye.   Working with old tactics and modern 45
technology, the war in Arabia was definitely semi-modern, like the conflict in the Middle 




While the troops at Gallipoli faced the cruelties of a modern technological warfare, 
almost including gas attacks, Lawrence in the southern parts of the Middle East, like 
Allenby in Palestine, was able to act fast and use his higher level of mobility. His 
“operations were like naval warfare, in their mobility, their ubiquity, their independence 
of bases and communications, in their ignoring of ground features, of strategic areas, of 
!  13
!  Ibid.45
fixed directions, of fixed points.”   This provided the stage for the creation of a myth, as 46
the war in Arabia “was simple and individual”   and could make a hero out of Lawrence.  47
It was not only the bad planning that made Gallipoli a failure, the geographical 
setting of the campaign as well as the fact that the British and ANZAC soldiers had to 
face the best equipped and modernized troops of the Ottoman Empire, led by capable 
officers, made this the most modern battlefield of the Middle Eastern theater of war. 
Taking these different places, scenarios, and outcomes into consideration, it seems to be 
suitable to call the Great War in the Middle East as a whole a semi-modern war.
!  14
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!  Ibid.47
